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COMMENTS

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE TRADEMARK
LAW REVISION ACT OF 1988?
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article provides an introduction and critique of to the Trademark Law Revision Act of 19881 (TLRA). First, this article summarizes the history and background of American trademark law to establish an analytical foundation. Second, it highlights the major provisions
of the TLRA, and compares them with the previous law. Finally, this
article presents an analysis of significant changes by the TLRA, with
particular focus on the intent-to-use and unfair competition provisions.
The article's analysis demonstrates that the TLRA's balancing of
policy considerations will likely make the American trademark system
more compatible with modern marketing practices. In addition, the
TLRA will result in more equal treatment of trademark applicants of
disparate geography and national citizenship. However, the analysis
also demonstrates that the TLRA is not perfectly balanced in all regards. The TLRA favors large, established trademark holders. It enables resource-rich, intent-to-use applicants to reserve numerous marks
for a single good or service for up to two years.' These reservations
impede the ability of small, start-up enterprises to compete through use
3
of attractive marks.
In order to correct this perceived inequity, this article submits that
the TLRA can be better balanced by statutorily limiting the number of
marks which an intent-to-use applicant may reserve for a single good or
service. Alternatively, a better balance can be achieved by restricting
the number of marks which an intent-to-use applicant may reserve for
a single good or service for a period longer than six months. In addi1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Citations to "sections" of the TLRA in this article also
include references to the sections of the Lanham Act, as is customary in trademark practice.
2. Lanham Act § l(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1) (1988).
3. "The term 'mark' includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark or certification
mark." Id. The term is used as a shorthand reference to any type of mark, whether or not "it
suffers from some . . .infirmity which renders it unregisterable" under federal trademark statutes. Dillon, Trademark Definitions, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 366, 369-70 (1989).
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tion, this article submits that Congress should act to specifically address the issue of consumer standing to sue under federal unfair competition law.
II. BACKGROUND
To best understand the changes enacted by the TLRA, it is important to have a foundation in the basic policies and precepts of the
American trademark system, as well as the legislative history of the
TLRA.' The foundational aspects of trademark law rely upon common
law for the identity, functionality, and property concepts of trademarks; but, they rely upon statutory regulation to achieve the proper
balance of goals and policies. As with most statutory schemes, the legislative history of the TLRA is an important resource for understanding the meaning, intent, and policies behind its enactment.
A.

Trademark Laws and Policies

A trademark has traditionally been defined as "any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof" adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured or sold by others, and to indicate the source
5
of the goods, even if that source is unknown. A trademark gives the
mark owner the right to prevent use of the mark by others when that
6
use is likely to deceive, result in confusion or cause mistake. The right
to exclude others continues under common law for as long as the mark
is properly used as a trademark.7 It continues under federal statutory
law for an initial period of ten years, which is infinitely renewable as
long as the statutory formalities are satisfied." By its nature, a trade9
mark can be a potent weapon in a competitive market, serving in at
least three distinct simultaneous capacities: (1) as an indication of origin or ownership; (2) as a guarantee of consistency of quality or other
For a thorough treatment of the law of trademarks see generally 3 L. ALTMAN, R.
§§ 17.01-17.25
(2d ed.
1:1-5:4
§§
COMPETITION
UNFAIR
AND
TRADEMARKS
MCCARTHY,
J.
1
(4th ed. 1981);
4.

CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES

1984). For expositions on the historical development of trademarks, see Diamond, The Historical

Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975); Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
5. Lanham Act§ 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. This definition is equally applicable to common law
trademarks. Clairol Inc. v. Gillette Co., 270 F. Supp. 371, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). For a detailed
analysis of the definition of a "trademark" and other terms used in trademark practice, see Diamond, Untangling the Confusion in Trademark Terminology, 65 A.B.A. J. 1523 (1979) and Dillon, supra, note 3, at 366.
6. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 6:3.
7. Id. § 6:2.
8. Lanham Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 1058.
9. 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 4, § 17.01.
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characteristics of a product or service; and (3) as a medium of advertisement.1" A trademark therefore evokes a reaction to the product or
service's figurative qualities, and, in this sense, depends upon the value
of the good or service." A trademark may also evoke a reaction to the
business of the trademark owner as a whole.' In addition, a trademark
reflects goodwill in the form of integrity, economic honesty and efficiency. A trademark is therefore useful in an advertising function as
providing a motivating power beyond merely informing the consumer
about the good, service or owner of the mark.'" This motivating power
is among the most important characteristics of a mark and demon4
strates its independent value.'
While the roots of modern trademark law arise from the medieval
practice of using marks to designate ownership or origin,'8 modern
trademarks go well beyond this limited concept. Today, consumers may
not even know the actual origin of goods or services sold under a well
known mark.' 6 The right to adopt and use a mark to distinguish one's
goods or services to the exclusion of all others was established by common law and by state statutes.' However, "the precise nature of trademark rights remains vague and indistinct."' 8 Some courts and commentators have labeled the interest in protecting a trademark as a

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The "independent value" of a trademark has an impact on the theoretical basis of
trademark law interpretation, for with such an "independent value," a trademark creates a property interest for the trademark holder.
15. Id. § 17.02.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) [hereinafter The Trade-Mark Cases].
As early as 1791, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson encouraged Congress to recognize trademark rights by statute. 14 AM. STATE PAPERS 48, reprinted in REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED TO REVISE THE STATUTES RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADE AND OTHER MARKS, AND
TRADE AND COMMERCIAL NAMES, S. Doc. No. 20, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1902). According to

one commentator, the first trademark statute enacted in the United States was by the New York
state legislature in 1845. Pattishall, The Consititutional Fondations of American Trademark
Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 456, 461 (1988) ("an Act to prevent fraud in the use of false stamps
and labels"). The first reported American trademark case was the 1837 Massachusetts case of
Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837), involving:
an action by the plaintiff who sold certain medicines of his own preparation under the
name 'Thomsonian Medicines.' The defendant began to sell inferior medicines under the
same name and suit was brought as an action on the case. The court recognized that there
was no exclusive rights in the name if it had become generic and descriptive of a class of
medicines even though a party may be damaged by inferiority of the medicines sold under
the same name. Shaw, C.J., held: 'The right to make and sell is common to all, if no deceit
is practi[c]ed by one, in falsely assuming the name and credit of another.'
Pattishall, supra, at 460 (quoting Thompson, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) at 216).
18. 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 4, § 17.02.
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"property right," which provides a basis for equitable relief.19 Another
view has been espoused that the interest in protecting trademarks arises
from the desire to protect the consuming public by preventing "palming
0
off" of one's goods as another's.2 The conclusion that a trademark has
no independent value (property right) appears to be attributable to judicial emphasis on the concept that a trademark is nothing more than
1
an indication of origin and a symbol of goodwill. This limited view
does not, however, consider either the guarantee function of trademarks
or their advertising value. 2 Modern trademark law should be analyzed
in light of the judicial and legislative balancing of limited property
rights with the desire to protect public interest. This combined basis
was best described over a century ago:
The right of property [in trademarks] does not in any manner depend for
its inceptive existence or support upon statutory law, though its enjoyment may be better secured and guarded, and infringements upon the
rights of the proprietor may be more effectually prevented or redressed
by the aid of the statute than at common law. Its exercise may be limited or controlled by statute, as in case of other property, but, like the
title to the good-will of a trade, which it in some respects resembles, the
right of property in a trade mark accrues without the aid of the statute.
[T]he proprietor may assert and maintain his23 property right wherever
the common law affords remedies for wrongs.
A trademark right has been referred to as an interest which is
enforceable at law and equity .which does not depend upon federal leg2
islation for its existence or enforcement. ' Thus, United States trade-

19. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1897); 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 4, § 17.07.
For tax purposes, American law recognizes a trademark as a property right which qualifies as a
capital asset. United States Mineral Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177 (1969). See
Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the Property Concept in
the Law of Trade-marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443 (1947) (asserting that the property concept is a
necessary basis for the protection of trademarks).
20. 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 4, § 17.07. "Palming off" is the term of art in trademark
practice coined by Justice Holmes, the leading proponent of the theory that trademark protection
arises from concern for the public interest so as to preclude "palming off" of one's goods as another's. See Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 193, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (1889).
When the common law developed the doctrine of trademarks and trade names, it was not
creating a property in advertisements more absolute than it would have allowed the author
of Paradise Lost; but the meaning was to prevent one man from palming off his goods as
another's, from getting another's business or injuring his reputation by unfair means, and,
perhaps from defrauding the public.
Id. at 193-94, 23 N.E. at 1069.
21. 3 L. ALTMAN, supra note 4, § 17.07.
22. Id.
23. Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292, 296 (1865).
24. Id. But see Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1943) (widely
cited opinion stating that Congress not only had authority to create substantive trademark rights
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mark law has traditionally been referred to as a "common law system,"
as opposed to a "registration-based system" found throughout most of
the world.2 5 Nevertheless, Congress has regulated trademarks by enacting trademark legislation since 1870.26 In particular, the 1946 Lanham

but did so in the Trademark Act of 1905).
25. Parker, "Intent to Use".- On the Road Toward Adoption of a Registration-Based System of Trademark Protection, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 319, 320 n.3 (1989). "Today, the United
States and the Philippines are the only two countries which require use of a mark before an
application for registration may be filed." Eck, Statement of the United States Trademark Association in Support of S. 1883 (DeConcini) The Trademark Law Revision Act, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 382, 387 (1988). "Although the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the Republic of
South Africa afford limited protection for unregistered marks, most countries require registration
for affirmative enforcement of trademark rights, and only the United States affords broad protection of unregistered marks." Parker, supra, at 319 n.2.
"While most foreign nations allow the registration of symbols before they have been actually used in trade, this is not the system followed in the United States. In America, a
symbol must actually have been used as a mark before that symbol can be registered under
federal or state law, or legally protected under the common law."
Id. at 320-21 n.4 (quoting I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 16:1).
26. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 376
(1989) [hereinafter TRC Report]. Significant federal trademark legislation was enacted in the
Trademark Acts of 1870, 1881, 1905, 1946 and 1988.
The Act of July 8, 1870 was erroneously titled "An Act To Revise, Consolidate, and Amend
The Statutes Relating To Patents And Copyrights" and granted exclusive rights in "any lawful
trademark" to those "who are entitled to the exclusive use of any lawful trade-mark or who intend
to adopt and use any trade-mark for exclusive use within the United States." Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 2, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198. The 1870 Act was held unconstitutional in 1879 in the Trade-Mark
Cases because it relied upon the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution. 100 U.S. 82
(1897). During the first year of the 1870 Act there were 486 trademark registrations. Pattishall,
supra note 17, at 462 n.22.
In the Act of Mar. 3, 1881, Congress perhaps overreacted to the holding of unconstitutionality in the Trade-Mark Cases, and strictly confined its application to marks used in commerce
"with Foreign nations or the Indian Tribes." Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. It
provided only for a means of registrations with little substantive change to the common law. Id.
During the first year of the 1881 Act there were 947 trademark registrations. Pattishall, supra
note 17, at 462 n.22.
In the Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Congress expanded federal trademark jurisdiction; established
the procedures of opposition, cancellation and interference; and established the registrability of
marks that have gained secondary meaning through continuous use. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592,
33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1947). In spite of these provisions, the 1905 Act afforded little substantive
rights beyond those established by the common law or the Act of 1881. Pattishall, supra note 17,
at 462. During the first year of the 1905 Act there were 10,568 registrations. Id. at 462 n.22.
The July 5, 1946 Lanham Act significantly expanded the jurisdiction and substance of federal trademark law to reach virtually all confusing or deceptive use of trademarks that substantially affected registered marks. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127 (1988).
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect
registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
,fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or
colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
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Act brought significant incentives to federally register trademarks; with
the incentives, came post-war economic, technological and communica2
tions growth, which caused an explosion of trademark activity.
The primary purposes underlying American trademark statutes
are twofold: (1) "to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark, . . . it will get
the product which it asks for and wants to get;" and, (2) "where the
owner of the trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public" his product, his investment should be protected from
misappropriation. Trademark statutes also promote the maintenance
and improvement of the quality of both goods and services, and stimu29
late innovative marketing and advertising. The statutes also tend to
foster healthy competition by preserving good will and investment in
product quality. They also foster product promotion by reducing "the
distortions of competition . . . result[ing] from purchases based on
treaties and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). In Pure Foods, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d
792, 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954), the Fifth Circuit enjoined a local defendant from infringing upon the plaintiffs mark used in interstate commerce, even though the plaintiff had not alleged and proved that the defendant used the mark in interstate commerce.
It is too well settled to require citation of authority that an activity local in nature but
which interferes with the free flow of interstate commerce or exercises a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce may be regulated by Congress. . . . [T]he Lanham
Act extends jurisdiction to [intrastate] infringement which has a substantial economic affect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 795.
27. TRC Report, supra note 26, at 376. The specific incentives for registration included
within section 7(b) of the Lanham Act were to expand the impact of registration to not only
establish prima facie evidence of ownership but also to establish the exclusive right to use. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 7(b), 60 Stat. 430 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (1988)). The
three features of the 1946 Lanham Act which have had, in retrospect, the most impact on American trademark law and enhanced the incentives for registration in the federal system are: (I) the
provision in section 22 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1072) that registration on the principal register shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership; (2) the provision in
section 43(a), (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)) forbidding false designations of origin, or any false description or representation tending falsely to describe or represent goods or
services; and (3) the provisions of sections 15 and 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065,
1115, respectively) affording incontestability status to all marks registered so long as such marks
are subsisting and have not been abandoned and have been in use for five consecutive years after
the registration has been published and an affidavit filed with the Commissioner. Pattishall, The
Lanham Trademark Act-Its Impact Over Four Decades, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 210 (1986).
The 1946 Lanham Act was born into a hostile legal environment. It was vigorously challenged by the Justice Department on monopoly grounds and took over twenty-six years to formulate in the face of so-called "monopoly phobia" in vogue during the "New Deal." Id. at 196-97.
28. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV.
1274, 1274. This twofold purpose reflects the TLRA's continuing recognition of the balanced basis
for protecting both the public interest as well as the mark "owner's" "property interest" in trademarks. Id.
29. TRC Report, supra note 26, at 387.
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confusion or deception," and by reducing the unjust enrichment of unfair competitors.80 Thus, the law's protection of trademarks represents
the recognition of the psychological function of symbols. 81 American
trademark law is a hybrid creature of identity, functionality and property which emanates from common law, but is statutorily regulated to
30. Id. For analysis and critique of the economic policies and theories which underlie trademark laws, see E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION § 4 (8th ed.

1969). The author criticized American trademark law as creating a legal monopoly over price for
an indefinite duration which lessened competition. The sole producer of a product brand preferred'

by consumers over an otherwise identical product because of symbolic differentiation, can charge a
higher price which at some point becomes disadvantageous to the consumer. Id.; see also
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 532-39 (1988) (asserting
that monopolies created by trademark laws are small and temporary and offset by the efficiencies
and necessities; i.e. low search costs based upon symbols, which allow consumers to easily distinguish the quality and variety of products).
The primary reasons for the existence and protection of trademarks are that (1) they
facilitate and enhance consumer decisions and (2) they create incentives for firms to produce products of desirable qualities even when these are not observable before purchase.
From an economic standpoint, the argument for trademarks is simple. In many markets, sellers have much better information as to the unobservable features of a commodity
for sale than the buyers. This is known as information asymmetry. Unobservable features,
valued by the consumer, may be crucial determinants of the total value of the good. Observable features can often be imitated to the smallest detail, even though huge differences
remain in the unobservable features of the product. In the absence of trademarks, faced
with the choice between goods which look identical, the consumer will only by chance pick
the one with the desirable unobservable qualities. Further, firms would produce products
with the cheapest possible unobservable qualities, because high levels of unobserved qualities would not add to a firm's ability to sell at a higher price and realize higher profits.
However, if there is a way to identify the unobservable qualities, the consumer's choice
becomes clear, and firms with a long horizon have an incentive to cater to a spectrum of
tastes for variety and quality, even though these product features may be unobservable at
the time of purchase.
The economic role of the trademark is to help the consumer identify the unobservable
features of the trademarked product. This information is not provided to the consumer in
an analytic form, such as an indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in
summary form, through a symbol which the consumer identifies with a specific combination of features.
Id. at 526-27 (footnotes omitted); see also Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,

78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988) (explaining and justifying trademark law from the "law and
economics" perspective).
31. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of
symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by
them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what
he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this

human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with
the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of
the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he
has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
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achieve its theoretical goals.
B.

Legislative History of the Trademark Law Revision Act

Enactment of the TLRA3 2 represents the first overall revision of
the federal trademark statute since the Lanham Act was passed in
1946.3 Changes reflected in the TLRA began as an intensive effort by
a commission of the United States Trademark Association." The
Trademark Revision Commission issued a report in 1987 and presented
a
its recommended changes to Congress.
The stated legislative purpose of the TLRA is three-fold. First, the
Act is intended to bring the trademark law up to date with present day
business practices.3 6 Second, the TLRA is intended to "increase the
value of the federal trademark registration system for [American] companies"" and to remove the preference that had been afforded to foreign companies applying to register trademarks in the United States."
Finally, it is intended to improve the law's protection of the public from
counterfeiting, confusion and deception by strengthening and a9clarifying
federal unfair competition law as set forth in section 43(a).
The goals of the changes to the Lanham Act recommended in the
TRC Report include the desire to:
1. "[Rleduce the advantage foreign [citizens] enjoy in obtaining
32. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3936 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)). The
legislative history of the TLRA is published in a single volume at UNITED STATES TRADEMARK
ASSOCIATION, TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF

1988 (1989) [hereinafter USTA].

33. Trademark Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)). The 1946 Act was called the "Lanham Act" after the bill's principal sponsor, Congressman Fritz G. Lanham.
34.

TRC Report, supra note 26, at 375, 380.

35. Id. at 375.
36. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
MIN

NEWS 5577 (also reprinted in USTA, supra note 32, at 153).
37. Id.
38. Id.

CONG.

&

AD-

39. Id. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), is entitled "False designations of
origin; false description or representation" and provides:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which (1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or likely to be damaged by such act.
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United States trademark rights; 40
2. "[R]educe the geographic fragmentation of trademark rights"
(i.e., reduce and clarify ambiguous language which resulted in differing
interpretations among various circuits); " '
3. "[M]ake the trademark system more equitable for all
trademark owners, whether . . . small entrepreneurs or large
42
corporations;
4. "[E]nhance the climate for investment by eliminating unnecessary and costly uncertainty for small and large companies in launching
new products;"'43
5. "[C]reate commercially-sound procedures for establishing
trademark rights without altering the fundamental principles of
' 44
[American] trademark law;
6. "[SJtrengthen federal law against unfair competition.' 45
The changes recommended by the TRC Report were introduced as
Senate Bill Number 1883 on November 19, 1987, by Senator Dennis
DeConcini (Democrat-Arizona), Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Committee.' 6 Identical legislation was introduced as House Bill Number 4156
in the House of Representatives on March 15, 1988, by Representative
Carlos Moorehead (Republican-California), Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee. 47 The Senate version was amended to delete TRC Report recommendations which
would have recognized causes of action under section 43(a) for compet40. USTA, supra note 32, at 249; see TRC Report, supra note 26, at 393 (policy supporting intent-to-use provision).
41. USTA, supra note 32, at 249.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Other goals of the recommended changes included:
1. Modernization of the Lanham Act by clarifying it, "removing inconsistencies, conforming it to
judicial interpretation and updating it to reflect modern . . . commercial realities." Id.
2. "[Elncourage[ment of] greater use of the [federal] trademark registration system." Id.
3. "[Ijmprove[ment in] the reliability of the federal trademark registration system by removing
from the register marks [which] are no longer in use" (elimination of "deadwood" trademarks).
Id.
4. Promotion of "fair competition by preventing others from trading [upon] the goodwill that
someone else has built in a . . . distinctive mark." Id.
5. "[P]rovide the courts with a clearer basis for interpreting trademark and unfair competition"
statutes. Id.
6. Not requiring increased "expenditure of tax dollars to implement" changes. Id.
46. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 16,546 (1987); see also USTA, supra
note 32, at 4.
47. H.R. 4156, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 665 (1988); see also USTA, supra
note 32, at 4.
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itors' omissions of material information in advertising, and for the
"8
tarnishment and disparagement of trademarks. The amendments proposed to add an anti-dilution provision, which would have given the
holders of "truly famous" marks the right to preclude others from us49
ing the mark on non-competitive goods or services. The amended bill
passed the Senate on May 13, 1988.50 The Senate Report was issued on
September 15, 1988.51
On September 23, 1988, Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier
(Democrat-Wisconsin), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judici-

48. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 5864-74. For examples of cases based
upon disparagement and tarnishment causes of action see Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld
Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (no cause of action against defendant's use of a pig head
and hooves with the word "Lardashe" on the back pocket of blue jeans in parody of plaintiff's
mark of a horse head and the word "Jordache" on the back pocket of blue jeans); L.L. Bean v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.) (unflattering and sexually explicit parody by a noncompetitor in High Society magazine did not give rise to a disparagement or tarnishment cause of
action), cert. denied & appeal dismissed, 487 U.S. 1013 (1887); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's mark damaged by unauthorized
use in promotion and content of a pornographic film); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining the merchandise of "Enjoy Cocaine" posters bearing
logo similar to plaintiff's mark).
49. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 5864-74. "Anti-dilution" refers to laws
which preclude the use of a famous mark in markets of no direct competition and no likelihood of
confusion, but the established mark is being diluted and the subsequent user is unfairly gaining
from the original mark holder's good will. Dilution is often associated with a "blurring" of the
distinguishability of a famous mark, and with the tarnishment of a famous mark. See generally
Schechter, supra note 4, at 825. Schechter, the "father" of American dilution theory, stated that
established distinctive trademarks should be protected against the tort of "gradual whittling away
or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use in noncompeting goods," based upon property rights of the owner of the mark. Id. But see Pattishall,
The Dilution Rationalefor Trademark-TradeIdentity Protection,Its Progressand Prospects, 67
TRADEMARK REP. 607 (1977) (criticizing Schechter's property rights theory for dilution actions
and espousing that dilution actions should arise from the concepts of commercial fair play and
equity).
Twenty-three states have anti-dilution statutes: ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1984); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 4-71-112 (1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-11i(c) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
495.151 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-4-151 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977); ILL.
REV. STAT. Ch. 140, para. 22 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 51:222 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. IOB, § 12 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061(1) (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. §
30-13-334 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); OR. REV.

§ 647.107 (1988); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
6-2-12 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1988); see also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (a well-publicized case involving a cause
of action brought under New York's anti-dilution laws regarding the mark "Lexis.").
50. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 5874 (1988).
51. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5577 (also reprinted in USTA, supra note 32, at 153).
STAT.
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ary Committee, offered substitute House Bill Number 5372.2 This alternative bill proposed additional changes, including provisions which
would have specifically recognized consumer standing to sue under section 43(a).
With the 100th Congress drawing to a close, time constraints precluded a formal House-Senate conference to resolve the numerous differences between the two bills. The staffs of the two Judiciary Committees therefore engaged in informal negotiations in an attempt to reach
a compromise." The negotiations resulted in a compromise which deleted both Representative Kastenmeier's consumer standing provision
and the Senate anti-dilution provision.5 5 On October 19, 1988, the compromise bill passed the House;"6 it passed the Senate on the following
day. 57 The bill was entitled the "Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988," designated as Public Law 100-667, and was signed by President
Reagan on November 16, 1988. The effective date of the act was No-

52. H.R. 5372, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 8135 (1988).
53. Id.; HR. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in USTA, supra note 32, at
253. H.R. 5372 proposed adoption of the TRC Report recommendations regarding intent-to-use
applications and reducing the term of a trademark from 20 years to 10 years to eliminate "deadwood" trademarks. It also proposed adoption of language which would have specifically recognized
consumer standing to sue under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. See H.R. 5372, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. 8135. H.R. 5372 adopted the
rationale of Chairman Kastenmeier expressed in Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and
Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 301 (1979).
Congress should act once and for all to confront the delicate issue of standing and remove
inappropriate judicially constructed barriers to the federal judicial system. Clarity and consistency ought to be the ultimate goals. This would render the courts more efficient by
reducing the amount of time involved in resolving threshold issues; at the same time, it
undoubtedly will increase their overall workload by raising the number of lawsuits filed in
federal courts. On balance, however, considering the other reforms discussed herein, the
federal courts will not be unduly burdened by liberal standing legislation.
Id. at 328.
The proposed bill also recognized that such legislation would resolve the conflict between the
circuits on whether or not the consumers have the right to sue for deceptive trade practices under
section 43(a). Compare Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.) (in enacting
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress did not intend to grant consumers the right to sue),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) with Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir.
1984) (the plain meaning of section 43(a) affords standing to any person who believes that he has
been damaged by a defendant's use of false representations in advertising). See I J. GILSON,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE

7-24 to 7-25 (1988) (supporting a broad reading of

section 43(a) to include consumer standing).
54. USTA, supra note 32, at 5; see S. 1883, 100th Cong. 2d. Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,419
(1988) (statement by Rep. Kastenmeier recognizing the bill as a product of extensive negotiations
and compromises).
55. USTA, supra note 32, at 5.
56. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,411-29 (1988) (reprinted in USTA,
supra note 32, at 315-30).
57. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 16,971-76 (1988) (reprinted in USTA,
supra note 26, at 333-37).
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vember 16, 1989."
C. Major Provisions
The TLRA enacts two important changes. First, it permits trademark applications and priority based upon intent to use a mark. Second, it revises the unfair trade practices section, section 43(a), to clarify and standardize treatment of claimants and available remedies.
1. Intent-to-Use
The TLRA permits the establishment of priority in a trademark
based upon the filing date of an intent-to-use application." As noted
above, priority and application had historically been based solely upon
actual use in commerce.10 Section 1(b) provides that the intent-to-use
application must be based upon the applicant's bona fide intention to
use the mark in interstate commerce. The Patent and Trademark Office reviews the intent-to-use application for registrability under section
2 of the Lanham Act. If the mark is deemed registrable by the Patent
and Trademark Office, the proposed mark is published in the Official
2
Gazette6 1 to give public notice of the applicant's intent to use. If the
proposed mark is not opposed during the comment period which follows
publication, then the Patent and Trademark Office will issue a certificate of allowance." However, for the intent-to-use application to result
in registration of the proposed mark, the applicant must, within six
months of the notice of allowance, file a verified statement that the
mark has actually been used in interstate commerce." The applicant
may extend the deadline for filing the certification for six months as a
matter of right, and up to an aggregate period of twenty-four months
for good cause shown. 5 If the proposed mark is not used in interstate
commerce within such time, then the priority date that would have
been established is forfeited."6
The result of this change to trademark law is that the United
States now has a "dual system" of trademark priority.67 Priority can be

58. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, § 136, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3936.
59. Lanham Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1988).
60. Id. § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
61. The Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office is the statutorily designated
publication source to provide public notice of trademark registrations. Lanham Act § 12(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1062(a).
62. Lanham Act § l(d)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
65. Id. § 1(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2).
66. Id. § 1(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(4).
67. See TRC Report, supra note 26, at 390.
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established by either traditional actual use in commerce or by the filing
of an intent-to-use application followed by actual use.68 The rationale
for the dual system is to recognize that, under modern business practices, it is common to spend large amounts of time, effort and money to
bring brands to market prior to actual use. 9 Under the TLRA's intentto-use provision, a company can determine whether the mark they intend to use will be challenged by another who is already using the
mark.70 The intent-to-use provisions, therefore, give the business some
assurance that the business will be able to register the proposed mark
before incurring substantial costs. 7 1 Government publication of intentto-use notices might bring out potential conflicts with established trademark holders and save the applicant the expenses that would otherwise
be incurred.72 Also, if a conflict becomes apparent early enough, the
applicant may be more willing to abandon the proposed mark since he
may not yet have made a substantial investment in the mark. In this
respect, the TLRA's intent-to-use provisions are compatible with modern marketing practices and result in efficiency.74
The intent-to-use provisions may, however, have several drawbacks. First, the provisions may create an additional trademark "deadwood 17 5 problem by encouraging applicants to reserve numerous marks
for a single product or service for up to two years. This would encumber the trademark system and prevent newcomers from finding competitive marks.7 6 Second, the advantages of intent-to-use may be overrated
because the intent-to-use provisions will do nothing to "prevent a
pirater from using the mark before either application or publication. 7 7
Intent-to-use also "disregards the traditional notion that trademark
rights are acquired through use and the public['s] associat[ion of] a
68.

See id.

69.

Id. at 392.

70. Id. at 392-93; see Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975). The
parties independently planned to use an identical mark on competing goods and priority was based
upon the first to use in commerce. Id. at 1262. The circumstances of this case could have been
avoided under the intent-to-use application system of the TLRA.
71.
72.

See TRC Report, supra note 26, at 392-93.
Vinicombe, The Constitutionality of an Intent to Use Amendment to the Lanham Act,
78 TRADEMARK REP. 361, 365 (1988).
73. Id.
74. TRC Report, supra note 26, at 392-93.

75. "Deadwood" refers to federally registered trademarks which are not actually used in
commerce and are therefore not protected by the Lanham Act.
76. See Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 365-66.
77. Id. at 366. "Pirater" refers to one who intentionally holds out or "palms-off' his goods
to be those of another. Id. "Application" refers to the written notice submitted to the patent and
trademark office of use or intent to use in commerce. Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1989).
"Publication" refers to public notice of trademark registration in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a).
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mark with [its] owner." '7 8 Finally, "conflicts with pre-existing marks
are unlikely to be revealed by [government] publication because of the
commercial reality that many trademark holders" (especially small
businesses) will not consult Patent and Trademark Office publications
the expenwith a degree of frequency sufficient to raise conflicts before
mark.7 9
proposed
a
toward
resources
substantial
of
diture
The prior use-based system was criticized as unrealistic and perplexing to American businesses because it failed to reflect and properly
80
consider modern business practices. The inadequacies of the actualuse system also resulted in so-called "token-use" to establish registrability. "Token-use" is a doctrine recognized by the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board which permits registration where there is at least
one bona fide sale of goods in commerce "accompanied by activities or
circumstances evidencing an intent to continue use of the mark on the
81
product on a commercial scale." The "token-use" doctrine is inefficient because it causes applicants to make a commercially false ("token") sale in order to constructively qualify for trademark application. ' 2 It also results in "deadwood" by enabling an applicant to
preclude others from using marks that will never be used on a commercial scale. 8 The intent-to-use provisions of the TLRA eliminate the
need for, and the resulting inadequacies of, the "token-use" doctrine
84
which had arisen under the actual-use system.
Another problem remedied by the intent-to-use provision of the
TLRA is the elimination of the preference which had been given to
foreign applicants who had never actually used their mark in their own
country.8 5 In Crocker National Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce,86 the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board permitted foreign
applicants to register for United States trademarks based upon their
87
foreign intent-to-use application. This resulted in foreign applicants
gaining priority over domestic applicants by having an effective registration date based upon mere application with intent to use rather than
8
the date of actual use, as applied to domestic applicants. Congress

78. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 366.
79. Id.
80. TRC Report, supra note 26, at 392.
81. See CPC Int'l., Inc. v. Seven-Up Co., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 379, 381 (TTAB 1983)
(recognizing, in dicta, the concept of "token use" based upon a single bona fide sale).
82. TRC Report, supra note 26, at 392-93.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
86. 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909 (TTAB 1984).
87. Id.
88. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/6

1988 TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT

1990]

specifically intended to correct this disparity between domestic and foreign applicants by enacting the intent-to-use provisions of the TLRA. s9
In spite of the advantages of an intent-to-use system, maintaining
the elements of the actual-use system has the advantages of being a
clear constitutional exercise of Congressional power, 90 upholding the
traditional importance of use in the American trademark system and
case law. 9 1 The TLRA accordingly enacts a "dual system" of trademark priority seeking to gain the advantages of both the actual-use and
intent-to-use systems, while eliminating some of their disadvantages.9 2
In this respect, the TLRA achieves a balance of policy considerations
and makes the American trademark system more compatible with
modern marketing practices. It also results in more equal treatment to
applicants regardless of their national citizenship.
A pure intent-to-use system may be constitutionally questionable.
The United States Supreme Court held in the Trade-Mark Cases that
an intent-to-use system established by the Trademark Act of 1870 was
an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power.93 The Court held
that an intent-to-use system has no constitutional basis because the
Constitution did not specifically grant Congress the power to make
trademark laws. 94 Also, the Court held that because an intent-to-use
system did not require actual use in interstate commerce, Congress
could not rely upon the commerce clause as the constitutional basis for
the legislation."
Early cases arising under the TLRA are likely to involve constitutional challenges. The fact that some intrastate uses of trademarks are
beyond the power of congressional regulation lends support to the argument that the intent-to-use system is unconstitutional."
[Flederal courts have held that trademarks used only in intrastate commerce, not having a substantial effect on interstate commerce, fall
.outside the regulatory power of Congress'.97 Consequently,. . . Congress'

89. 134 CONG. REC. 10,422 (1988) (Rep. Moorhead stated that "[tlhe legislation contains
[I]t
an intent-to-use application system which responds to the needs of American businesses ....
eliminates the advantage foreign companies enjoy in applying for U.S. trademark rights."); 134
CONG. REc. 16,972 (1988) (Sen. DeConcini stated that "[intent-to-use provisions] would eliminate preferential treatment of foreign trademark applicants who are currently exempted from the
use in commerce requirement.").
90.
91.
92.

TRC Report, supra note 26, at 393.
id.
Id.

93. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
94.
95.

Id.
Id.

96. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 367.
97. Id. Arguments that trademark use under any circumstances is so substantially related to
interstate commerce as to give. Congress regulatory power under the commerce clause are unper-
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commerce power is [not] so expansive that Congress has regulatory
power over the entire field of trademarks, as it does over patents and
copyrights.98

Patent and copyright powers are constitutionally delegated to Congress. 99 If "intent" is not considered by the courts to be an "act" in
commerce, then the commerce clause will not apply. 100 Congress may
not be able to constitutionally regulate "an intent to use a mark, which
precedes any use at all, [since] federal courts have consistently held
that there are still intrastate uses beyond Congress' regulatory
power." '
Arguments supporting the constitutionality of the intent-to-use
provisions of the TLRA are based upon the Trade-Mark Cases, the
"flow of commerce" doctrine, general commerce clause principles, the
Civil Rights cases, the expanding applicability of the Lanham Act itself, and the necessary and proper clause.10 2 Although the Trade-Mark
Cases limit congressional power over trademarks,108 they also, rather
ironically, support the view that an intent-to-use system is constitutional.10 " The only basis cited by the Supreme Court for holding the
Trademark Act of 1870 unconstitutional was Congress' failure to limit
the Act's scope to interstate commerce.10 5 "Arguably, if intent-to-use
[is] unconstitutional, [per se,]
Act] unconstitutional on [that]
Intent-to-use may also be
"flow of commerce" doctrine,

the Court would have held the [1870
. . .basis." 108
constitutionally sustainable under the
because "'acts purely local in nature

may be conceptually considered as being in the flow or stream of commerce when they are at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of
interstate or foreign traffic.' "107 Therefore, it can be argued that Congress should be permitted to regulate trademarks when there is mere

intent to use the mark, as long as it is followed by actual use in or
suasive in light of many rulings finding the absence of Congressional jurisdiction under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Thompson Tank & Mfg. v. Thompson, 693 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1982);
Peter Pan Restaurants, Inc. v. Peter Pan Diner, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 534, 533-37 (D.R.I. 1957).
98. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 367-68.
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to the respective Writings
and Discoveries." Id.
100. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 368.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 100 U.S. at 82. For a general discussion of the Trade-Mark Cases, see Comment,
Trademark Problems and Trade-Mark Laws, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 20, 25-27 (1937).
104. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 369.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 370 (quoting 1 J.MCCARTAY, supra note 4, at § 19:37(A) n.2.).
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affecting interstate commerce."' 8
From a practical stand point, it is difficult to imagine the TLRA's
intent-to-use provisions being found unconstitutional given the Supreme
Court's modern deference toward congressional power under the commerce clause." 9 Legislation enacted under the commerce clause will
only be struck down by the courts if: (1) there is no rational basis for
Congress' finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce; or (2) there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory
means selected and the asserted legitimate ends.110 Marks intended to
be used in interstate commerce followed by actual use appear to meet
these threshold criteria, enabling the courts to uphold Congress' power
to regulate trademarks under the TLRA's intent-to-use provisions. Indeed, the very nature of a trademark is for use and affect on commerce,
and to assert the contrary would not likely succeed.
Related to this expansive interpretation of the commerce clause
are the so-called Civil Rights Cases "1 which expand even further judi-

cial deference to Congress under the commerce clause.1 1 2 Court decisions interpreting the Lanham Act prior to adoption of the TLRA reflect further judicial deference to Congress in the regulation of
trademarks. 8
The necessary and proper clause of the Constitution also supports
finding the TLRA's intent-to-use provisions to be constitutional." The

108. Id.
109. Id. at 371-72. For an example of the deference exercised by federal courts toward
Congress, and modern commerce clause analysis, see Texas v. United States, 730 F.2d 339, 348
(5th Cir.) (courts will defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce as long as there is any rational basis for it), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892
(1984).
110.. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
111. See Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 373-75; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 421 (1964) (hotels are within the scope of congressional power under the
commerce clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants are within the
scope of congressional power under the commerce clause); Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning
Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946) (hours and wages of window cleaners who service plants that produce
goods for interstate commerce are within the scope of congressional power under the commerce
clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (agricultural commodities are within the scope
of congressional power under the commerce clause); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(hours and wages of employees in local manufacturing are within the scope of congressional power
under the commerce clause).
112. Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 373-75.
113. See Id. For cases showing expansive jurisdictional interpretation by the federal courts
see Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distrib., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 558-59 (1st Cir. 1982) (even where
defendant's sales were entirely intrastate, infringement by defendant of a mark of another that is
used in interstate commerce is within scope of Lanham Act); In re Silenus Wines, Inc., 557 F.2d
806, 811-12 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (intrastate sale of imported wines falls within the scope of interstate
commerce under the Lanham Act).
114. See Vinicombe, supra note 72, at 377-80.
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necessary and proper clause provides that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all of the Powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof."1 1 This clause particularly supports the proposition that Congress' regulation of trademarks is necessary and proper to carry-out its power to regulate interstate commerce.
The courts have already recognized that:
[i]f a registrant's right to employ its trademark were subject within
every state's borders to preemption or concurrent use by local business,
the protection afforded a registrant by the Lanham Act would be rendered virtually meaningless. Therefore we think it is within Congress'
'necessary and proper' power to preclude a local intrastate user from acquiring any right to use the same mark.11 6
The intent-to-use provision of the TLRA appears constitutional
because the intent-to-use applicant must assert a bona fide intent to use
the mark in interstate commerce. 17 In addition, registration does not
occur until actual use of the mark in interstate commerce." 8 Given the
long history of constitutionality of the actual-use trademark system and
the TLRA's maintenance of use in commerce as the ultimate basis for
registration, positions challenging the constitutionality of the TLRA's
intent-to-use provisions appear doomed."19 While it is expected that
some of the early cases arising under the TLRA will raise the issue of
constitutionality, it is likely that constitutionality will be upheld.' 20
2.

Unfair Trade Practices under Section 43(a)

Prior to the TLRA, section 43(a), relating to unfair trade practices, essentially provided relief for false advertising when misrepresentations were made about the advertiser's goods, i.e., goods that the alleged wrongdoer placed in interstate commerce.'' Even then, the
misrepresentation was actionable only if it related to the inherent quality or character of the product or service.' 2 2
The TLRA changes the language of section 43(a) to provide for

115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
116. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959).
117. Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
118. Id.
119. See TRC Report, supra note 26, at 406-07 for an analysis of the constitutionality of
the TLRA.
120. Id. at 406-07.
121. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988)); see also Driscoll, The "New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 240 (1989).
122. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 stat. 427, 441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).
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liability when any person makes a "false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact . . . in commercial

advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities. . .

."I'

The TLRA thus expands

section 43(a) to apply to statements regarding another's goods or services. Because the TLRA refers not only to goods or services, but also
to "commercial activities,"1 24 the prior limitation of recognizing a
cause of action only if a misrepresentation related to the inherent quality or character of a good or service no longer applies."'
The revised section 43(a) also provides significant additional relief
for plaintiffs. In particular, it provides more relief for those who previously only had recourse to state law concerning trade libel or disparagement of their goods or services.126 These types of state law actions
often require a higher burden of proof than the preponderance of the
evidence standard as required for section 43(a) actions.1 27 In addition,
in state law actions special damages, such as actual lost sales or actual
lost customers, must usually be plead and proved.' 28
Prior to amendment, section 43(a) provided that a civil action for
false designation of origin, could be brought only by a "person doing
business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin ...

,."119

This

narrow language reflected "the apparent view of the draftsmen in 1946
that liability for false designations of origin would relate only to geography. .

".".,0

However, courts tend to recognize standing in "anyone

likely to be damaged in a commercial sense by acts of unfair competition."'' The TLRA amended section 43(a) to comport with the courts'
broad interpretation. 2
The TLRA provides that a civil action for unfair competition may
be brought "by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
123.

Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).

124. Id.
125. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 241.
126. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
127. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 240. Cf. Payrolls & Tabulating, Inc. v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 22 A.D.2d 595, 257 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1965) (clear and convincing evidence standard).
128. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 241. For an example of state law regarding the requirement of pleading and proving special damages in trade libel or disparagement, see, e.g., Christopher Lisa Matthew Policano, Inc. v. North Am. Precis Syndicate, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 488, 514
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1987).
129. Lanham Act, § 43(a) ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988)); see also Driscoll, supra note 121, at 241.
130. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 241.
131. Id. at 241-42; see Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1984).

132. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 243.
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be damaged by such act."'13 This amended section describes standing
quite broadly and leaves questions concerning the limits of standing to
be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 13 4 The most significant issue concerning standing under section 43(a) is whether consumers can sue for
false advertising." 8' A provision which would have specifically provided
for consumer standing was eliminated from the House version of the
TLRA.' " This may be interpreted by the courts as legislative intent to
prohibit consumer standing. However, the legislative history suggests
the possibility of a contrary conclusion.137 Representative Kastenmeier,
who proposed the consumer standing provision and who later withdrew
it, stated that he agreed to withdraw the language because the Act
already provided for consumer standing to sue under section 43(a).
Therefore, the language was superfluous.13 8 Representative Kastenmeier's conclusion is not, however, clearly supported by prior interpretations of the Lanham Act.1" 9
The previous law made no express provision of remedies for violations of section 43(a). "1 0 Lacking specific statutory language, the circuits varied the remedies which they recognized."" Some of the remedies consistently recognized included injunctions and damage
awards. " 2 However, attorney fees were inconsistently awarded." To

133.
134.
135.
136.

Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Driscoll, supra note 121, at 242.

Id.

H.R. 5372, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,419 (1988). Rep. Kastenmeier
stated:
Consumer interests have also been the subject of compromise in this legislation. As reported. . .the bill would have explicitly acknowledged that consumers have standing to sue
for violations of section 43(a), which provides a cause of action for unfair competitive acts
such as false and misleading advertising. The agreement, however, deleted this provision
from the bill. While I support the deletion as part of the necessary compromise on this bill,
it is unfortunate in the long run. I continue to believe that consumers already have standing

to sue under current law, and that the provision that was deleted only clarified that law.
Id.
137. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 242.
138. H.R. 5372, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,419 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
139. Driscoll, supra note 121, at 242; see Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y. Ltd, 442 F.2d
686 (2d Cir.) (in enacting section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress did not intend to grant
consumers the right to sue), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
140. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. § 1127(a) (1988)).
141. Compare Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 584 F. Supp. 656, 667-68 (D. Conn.) (only
injunctive relief is available under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act), affd, 748 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.
1984) with Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 715 (8th
Cir. 1980); see also Richard v. Auto Publisher, Inc., 735 F.2d 450, 453-58 (1ith Cir. 1984)
(damages, as well as injunctive relief, are among the remedies available under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act).
142. U-Haul Int'l., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1986); see gener-
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achieve consistency to citizens of all circuits, the TLRA recognized the
remedies of damages, injunctions, and, in exceptional cases only, attorney fees. 144 The unfair competition section of the TLRA accordingly
represents a broadening of federal protection available to those harmed
by unfair trade practices. It also standardizes remedies available, irrespective of the federal circuit in which the claimant filed. 1 5
III.

ANALYSIS

As noted above, the intent-to-use provisions of the TLRA 1"6 represent an effort to make American trademark law more compatible
with modern marketing practices by recognizing the tremendous expense that many marketers devote to a product before a mark is used
in commerce. The intent-to-use provisions allow companies to test
marks before they use them in the marketplace. However, this new system may allow large, established trademark holders and applicants to
impede competition from small, start-ups by monopolizing attractive
marks.1 47

While the TLRA requires bona fide intent-to-use, 14" the legislative
history indicates that one can reserve several marks for the same product until test marketing, consumer research and product development
are completed."49 The TLRA leaves it entirely to the Patent and Trademark Office and the courts to control abuses of the intent-to-use system
without any statutory guidance. 5° The legislation, therefore, does not
sufficiently protect against abuses by large marketers.15 ' This allows a
criticism of trademark law prior to the enactment of the TLRA to perpetuate. The circuits are likely to be inconsistent in their interpretations where there is a lack of clear legislative guidance.' 52
Inconsistency among the circuits is likely because "bona fide intent-to-use" is not defined in the statute.' 53 Large, resource rich applicants can gain a competitive edge, by reserving numerous marks under
ally Driscoll, supra note 121, at 244.
143. Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg., 803 F.2d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 1986); Metric,
635 F.2d at 715; see generally Driscoll, supra note 138, at 244.
144. Lanham Act §§ 34, 35 & 36, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1117 & 1118.
145. See generally Driscoll, supra note 121, at 244.
146. Lanham Acts § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
147. Haber, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: Advantages and Disadvantages,
JOURNAL OF PROPRIETARY

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
1051(b)

RTs., Feb. 1989, at 18.

Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052; see generally id.
See S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 133 CONG. REc. 16,546 (1987).
Haber, supra note 147, at 20.
Id.
Id.
"Bona fide intent-to-use" is legislatively created in Lanham Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C.
(1988).
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intent-to-use provisions for up to two years for a single good or service.
Resource rich applicants can afford not only to pay the intent-to-use
application fees, but to undertake market studies sufficient to support a
claim of bona-fide intent-to-use as well. This gives them the ability to
prevent small, start-up enterprises with limited resources from competing with attractive marks.' 5 An often cited criticism of the concept of
"token-use" was the practice of leaving the measure of bona-fide intent
to interpretation by applicants and the courts. 155 The TLRA was intended to remedy that criticism.'" While the TLRA technically eliminates "token-use," it does not eliminate all of the problems for which
that doctrine was criticized. The potential for this problem persists because the TLRA does not legislatively establish a specific limit on the
number of marks which may be reserved for a single good or service
under the intent-to-use provisions.157
I Small, unestablished mark applicants may also be harmed in that
the opposition process " may tilt against them. Under the old system,
the applicant already had an investment to protect and was, therefore,
likely to fight an opposition.15 Under the TLRA, applicants with opposed marks are more likely to abandon them in the face of a challenge, leaving large, established mark holders with the resources to
challenge new marks, in competitive control of the attractive marks in
their fields. 160 Under the TLRA, owners of existing marks are, therefore, likely to take a more aggressive stand in opposing new marks.' 6 '
This, too, reflects bias in favor of large, established mark holders to the
detriment of small, start-up enterprises of limited resources. The bias
ultimately leads to the detriment of the consuming public by providing
less variety and higher costs associated with reduced competition.'
While the TLRA clarifies the causes of action and remedies for
false advertising claims under section 43(a), it represents no real substantive change to the way some circuits have interpreted the Lanham
Act. 6" The courts may, however, interpret the legislative history as an

154. Haber, supra note 147, at 20.
155. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
156. Haber, supra note 147, at 20; see supra text accompanying notes 80-84 for a discussion of "token use."
157. See Lanham Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
158. "Opposition" is the process by which one challenges proposed registration of a mark,
based upon the belief that he will be damaged by the registration. Lanham Act § 13, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1063.
-159. Haber, supra note 147, at 20.
'160.
Id.
161. Id. at 20-21.
162. Id.
163. Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg., 803 F.2d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 1986) (refusing
to provide remedy of attorney's fees for common law trademark action brought under the Lanham
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indication that the unfair trade practices section should be construed
even more broadly and be more strictly enforced. 1' This may result in
a chilling effect on even legitimate comparative advertising, 165 to the
overall loss to the consuming public. 6 ' Increased damage awards that
may result from such will also discourage comparative advertisements,
especially by new entrants to a market who can least afford it. 6 ' This,
too, reflects bias in the TLRA in favor of large, established mark
holders.
A.

What Are the Problems?

The mere expenditure of money should not, in itself, create legally
protectable trademark rights. Those with the most economic resources
will monopolize attractive marks in their markets to the detriment of
competition and the consuming public." 6 By enacting intent-to-use provisions without limits on the number of marks which an applicant may
simultaneously claim for a single product or service, the revisions of the
TLRA tend to expand the monopoly on commercial words to the detriment of both those who need them most to compete and the consuming
public. 6
TLRA section 43(a) includes broad language which provides a
cause of action to any person who believes that he or she is, or is likely
to be, damaged.17 0 This may be construed to grant consumer standing
and a cause of action in federal court under section 43(a), thus making
the federal courts a small claims system for all consumer advertisement
claims.1 "1 This, in turn, may result in excessive burdens on the federal
courts and may tend to haul small, start-up businesses into the costly
and time consuming arena of federal court to address consumer complaints from any person who thinks he is "likely" to be injured from
17
the marketer's advertising statements.

Act); U-Haul Int'l., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1986) (remedies available under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act include injunctions and damage awards); Thorn v.
Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing standing for anyone likely to be
damaged in a commercial sense by acts of unfair competitor); Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metrics, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 1980) (remedies available under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act include attorney fees); see also Haber, supra note 147, at 20.
164. Haber, supra note 147, at 20.
165. Id. Comparative advertising refers to commercial speech comparing or contrasting the
goods, services or reputation of the vendor to the competitor's goods, services or reputation. See id.
166. Id.
167. Nat'l L. J., Oct. 30, 1989, at 33, col. 1.
168. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th. Cir. 1968).
169. Nat'l L. J., supra note 167, at 33, col. 1.
170. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
171. Nat'l L. J., supra note 167.
172. Id.
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What Are the Solutions?

One solution to TLRA shortcomings is to limit the number of proposed marks which an applicant may simultaneously reserve for a particular product or service by intent-to-use applications; for example,
limit applicants to one to three co-pending applications at a time. This
limit should be expressly provided within the trademark statute itself.
The mere inclusion of language which requires a bona fide intent does
not establish any objective standard and leaves the issue open for variable interpretation by applicants and courts.17 3 Amending the TLRA to
limit intent-to-use applications would still achieve the benefits of the
intent-to-use system, but would limit the potential for monopolistic
abuse. Limiting the number of intent-to-use applications would also reduce the number of conflicts that might arise in opposition proceedings,
which would otherwise force mark seekers to use less attractive marks.
An alternative approach, limiting potential abuses of the TLRA's
intent-to-use provisions, is to limit the number of marks for which an
applicant may obtain extensions of the initial six month intent-to-use
application period. This approach allows mark applicants to initially
reserve several marks for a short period in order to conduct marketing
tests, but requires the applicant to relinquish more quickly marks
which they are not likely to use. This would eliminate intent-to-use
"deadwood" and make such marks more timely available to
competitors.
While it is recognized that the TLRA represents a compromise
position on the issue of consumer standing, 17 ' the likelihood that the
courts will interpret the TLRA to provide for consumer standing to the
detriment of small comparative advertisers and federal court dockets
justifies Congress addressing the issue "head-on." Congress should
amend TLRA section 43(a) to refuse consumer standing or enact a
minimum dollar amount which must be plead to invoke federal jurisdiction for consumer suits. This would avoid subjecting advertisers to
federal court claims for small-valued claims by consumers. Such an
amendment to the TLRA will help keep small businesses competitive in
the trademark and advertising arenas by eliminating the high cost of
defending consumer false advertising claims in federal court.
The TLRA may have the effect of bringing "the competitive battlefield beyond the shelves of the supermarket and into the hall of the
courthouse.' 7 ' While the TLRA will accomplish many positive goals
and represents an attempt to achieve a balance of policies and interests,

173.
174.
175.

Id.
See supra notes 62 & 142 and accompanying text.
Nat'l L. J., supra note 167.
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it is far from a panacea. It has considerable potential to favor estab-

lished mark holders to the detriment of start-up competitors and the
consuming public. To overcome this potential for monopolistic abuse,
the TLRA should be amended to limit the number of intent-to-use ap-

plications that an applicant may have pending or may extend beyond
the initial intent-to-use term for a particular good or service.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The TLRA will achieve its goals of making the American trademark system more compatible with modern marketing practices and
will cause trademark applicants of disparate geographic and national
citizenship to be treated more equally. However, the TLRA is biased in
favor of large, established trademark holders and will lessen direct
competition to the detriment of the consuming public. These shortcomings can and should be remedied, or at least better balanced, by
amending the TLRA to include specific limits on the number of continuing, co-pending intent-to-use applications for a good or service, and to
specifically address the issue of consumer standing to sue under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Todd B. Carver
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